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BURYING OUR MISTAKES

JENNIFER MERRIGAN AND JOSEPH PERKOVICH*
PROLOGUE
Tuesday, January 31, 2017, at 5:45 p.m. CST: Thirty-six-year-old Mark
Christeson sits in a suicide watch cell, at the Eastern Diagnostic, Reception and
Correctional Center in Bonne Terre, Missouri. He is due to die in little more than
hour. He sits on the telephone with his attorneys, who just learned from the
Supreme Court clerk that his last appeal had been denied. Before the prison cuts
off the call—without notice—Mark’s counsel try to explain that all of his
appeals are finished, and thus he will soon die. Mark does not understand the
machinations his lawyers are attempting to explain. But he is worried about how
his execution will affect others—his family and his lawyers. He wants his
family, especially his brother Billy, sister-in-law, Kathy, and their three children,
to know how much he loves them. And he is confused; he cannot understand
why there is no way to appeal from the U.S. Supreme Court’s denial or why the
governor will not change his mind after already denying clemency. His lawyers
are perplexed too. In the two years leading up to this moment, the state and
federal courts in Missouri had jettisoned all but a veneer of judicial process,
preempting any meaningful review of numerous Constitutional violations. What
transpired in that span, and during the preceding decades of his case, made sense
really to no one on that final call, but for vastly different reasons.

* Jennifer Merrigan and Joseph Perkovich are principal attorneys of the Phillips Black, Inc., a
nonprofit, public interest law practice, and are adjunct assistant professors of both the Saint Louis
University and Washington University law schools. This essay is a case study of the capital case of
Mr. Christeson, whom Missouri executed at the tail end of a wave of twenty executions that
occurred between November 2013 and January 2017. This account is from an interested party,
counsel for Mr. Christeson during his final years. The authors acted as Mr. Christeson’s pro bono
counsel during 2014 and, in 2015, were appointed to represent him, along with associate attorney
Kristin Swain, which they did until his execution in 2017. This submission aspires to set forth the
basic contours of the case, shedding light on the actual operation of Missouri’s state and federal
courts in relation to the condemnation of a native son. See Rushing To Execution – Ethical Issues
and Procedural Barriers in Christeson v. Roper, ABA DEATH PENALTY DUE PROCESS REVIEW
PROJECT, https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/projects/death_penalty_due_process_review_
project/events_meetings.html [https://perma.cc/QSS4-S62B].
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INTRODUCTION
The crime in this case was tragic and incomprehensible. The unspeakable
events of that winter day in 1998 remain uncertain, enveloped in confusion. The
loss of three lives, a mother and her two children, and the enduring grief, trauma,
injustice, and pain for those who loved them cannot be measured. On display in
this case is the inability of a human endeavor such as the justice system to deliver
succor for those forced to survive this kind of horror. For those consigned to
surviving an inconceivable human loss, our public institutions are wanting. This
reality is only exacerbated in this instance because the actual facts of how this
crime transpired, let alone its impetus, are likely to forever remain uncertain and
made even more so by the judicial system. As outlined below, the legal
proceedings for this case lacked the basic adversarial testing and due process
that our system, under law’s promise, requires.
The death penalty, under our constitutional law, does not operate to
condemn people merely based on the aspects of the crime itself. Instead, our
Constitution requires the sentencer to consider the “compassionate or mitigating
factors stemming from the diverse frailties of humankind.” 1 At the core of these
decisions is the fundamental principle that our system reserves the death penalty
for the worst of the worst, those rare individuals who are underserving of
mercy. 2
It is well established that even a “fatalistic and uncooperative” client “does
not obviate the need for defense counsel” to conduct mitigation investigation. 3
Mark Christeson was far from uncooperative; as his final attorneys had learned,
beginning from the first meeting with him in May 2014, Mark desperately
wanted the assistance of counsel and had languished in prison for nearly a
decade without any entity or individual—neither the federal courts nor courtappointed counsel—considering his most rudimentary rights. What is more, he
desperately needed counsel, because of his profound personal deficits that
foreclosed any ability to protect his legal interests within the context of federal
habeas corpus procedure. Mark’s deficits emerged—rather, his final counsel
began to uncover the broad outlines of his disability, cognitive impairments,

1. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545
U.S. 374, 377, 393 (2005) (holding that a capital defendant’s lawyer is bound to make reasonable
efforts to obtain and review material that counsel knows the prosecution will probably rely on as
evidence of aggravation at the trial’s sentencing phase); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 536–38
(2003) (explaining that had the jury been confronted with evidence, there was reasonable
probability that it would have returned with different sentence); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
398 (2000) (finding defendant was denied his constitutionally guaranteed right to effective
assistance of counsel when his attorneys failed to investigate and present substantial mitigating
evidence during sentencing phase of capital murder trial).
2. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568–69 (2005).
3. Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 40 (2009) (per curiam).
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brain injuries, and extraordinary trauma and related ailments—during what
would become the final thirty-two months of his life.
In October 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court stayed Mr. Christeson’s execution
minutes before Missouri was set to carry it out and, in January 2015, the high
Court summarily reversed the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, leading to its
remand to the Western District of Missouri for further proceedings. 4 In the
aftermath of these dramatic and rare events, the lower federal courts’ disdainful
deprivation of expert services for Mr. Christeson constructively denied his right
to representation under the federal statute that the Supreme Court had enforced
in his very case, under 18 U.S.C. § 3599. 5 The Supreme Court had overturned
the Eighth Circuit by a vote of seven to two in order to permit conflict-free
counsel to adduce evidence of Mark’s “severe cognitive disabilities,” yet his
final counsel were systematically denied the use of the experts necessary to take
information from the records and from the scores of witnesses who had observed
Mark—vitally, multi-generational factors of his life, from infancy to
adolescence and through the second half of his life, which he spent at the Potosi
Correctional Center in Mineral Point, Missouri.
I. BACKGROUND 6
Many aspects of Mark’s life demanded mercy. He was born into a family
with a multi-generational history of pervasive incest and pedophilia. Sixteen of
the men in his family, spanning generations, committed sex crimes against
children. Many of Mark’s relatives had been civilly committed, arrested,
diagnosed, or forced to register due to sexual offenses against children.
Eventually, however, each victimizer was allowed to return to the family.
Records reflect that Mark’s own “father,” 7 William, complained in mandated
counseling, imposed after being diagnosed and criminally charged as a
pedophile, that he much preferred to sleep with Mark, his one-year-old son, then
4. Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891, 896 (2015).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 3599 (2012) (providing expert testimony upon a finding that investigative,
expert, or other services are reasonably necessary for the representation of the defendant).
6. In the course of Mr. Christeson’s representation subsequent to the Supreme Court’s
remand, his counsel conducted scores of witness interviews and extensive, multigenerational
records collection. This amassed evidence of severe predation upon Mark, as a child, was only
exacerbated upon his entry, as a teenager, to the Potosi Correctional Center in Mineral Point,
Missouri—the home of Missouri’s death sentenced prisoners—where he was preyed upon,
mercilessly sexually exploited, and traded among powerful prisoners. The following section is
based on these witness interviews and records collection. See generally Rule 60(b)6) Motion to
Reopen Final Judgment Dismissing Habeas Corpus Application as Untimely at 27–41, Christeson
v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo. Aug. 28, 2015), ECF No. 125.
7. Mark loved his father, William, who was perhaps the closest thing to a caretaker he ever
experienced in his childhood. William was married to Mark’s mother, Linda. Mark, however, was
conceived from a liaison between Linda and William’s brother, John. Thus, biologically, the man
Mark knew as his father was his uncle, and one of Mark’s uncles was actually his biological father.
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his wife. Despite the exploitation Mark suffered from William, Mark understood
his father to be the most reliable caretaker and source of affection in the
vulnerable and marginal childhood he spent mainly in rural Missouri, interrupted
by temporary migrations to the California desert for seasonal agricultural work.
Mark’s mother suffered her entire life from severe mental health problems,
including schizophrenia and intellectual disability, and also sexually preyed
upon her young son. During Mark’s infancy and early childhood, family
members repeatedly caught his mother putting his penis in her mouth.
After the death of his father when Mark was twelve years old, an adult
cousin took custody of Mark after his mother acquiesced to her poor mental
health and to the cousin’s perennial desire to take charge of the children
throughout the family. The state of Missouri’s family services department
endorsed the arrangement. Thus, Mark spent his adolescence with his extended
family, or clan, living on an unincorporated piece of land in southern Missouri,
where the state’s eyes were not prying.
Subsisting in Saint James, Missouri from gasoline-powered generators
supplying electricity to old school buses and shacks, Mark and the other children
in his family were simply passed around from pedophile to pedophile, exposed
from a very early age to extreme sexual violence by their caretakers, who also
gamed the family services system for compensation from, in effect, exploiting
these children. During Mark’s adolescent years, his replacement caretaker, his
adult cousin whom he and other children called “Uncle,” spent his nights in
Mark’s bed instead of the one he nominally shared with his wife.
The unremitting sexual trauma at the hands of those responsible for his
welfare and protection had tragic consequences for Mark’s psychological
constitution. Society is becoming more aware of the grave effects sexual trauma
has for such victims. Even a single event of this kind has lasting, profound
consequences. The consequences of nightly depredations of the kind visited
upon Mark, with the imprimatur of society as he could conceive of it in his
isolated circumstances and limited mental capacity, are incalculable as a clinical
matter. As a matter of empathy, the personal effects of such ceaseless violation
are unfathomable. 8

8. See, e.g., MIC HUNTER, ABUSED BOYS: THE NEGLECTED VICTIMS OF SEXUAL ABUSE 45–
47 (Lexington Books 1990); TONI C. JOHNSON & ELIANA GIL, SEXUALIZED CHILDREN:
ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF SEXUALIZED CHILDREN AND CHILDREN WHO MOLEST 92
(1993); Christine Heim et al., Pituitary-adrenal and autonomic responses to stress in women after
sexual and physical abuse in childhood, 284 J. OF THE AM. MED. ASS’N 592, 592–96 (2000); A.B.
Rowan & D.W. Foy, Post-traumatic stress disorder in child sexual abuse survivors (1993): A
literature review, 6 J. TRAUMATIC STRESS 3, 3–20 (1993); George W. Woods & David Freedman,
Symptom presentation and functioning in neurodevelopmental disorders: Intellectual disability and
exposure to trauma, 1 ETHICS, MED. & PUB. HEALTH 348, 352 (2015); Mary Sykes Wylie, The
Long Shadow of Trauma, 34 PSYCHOTHERAPY NETWORKER 20, 23–24 (2010). See generally
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Mark Christeson was eighteen years old and trying to escape this physical,
sexual victimization when he was arrested with his sixteen-year-old cousin,
Jessie, in 1998. The two had fled to California, to the town where they spent
periods of their childhood, stretches that were, by comparison, humane and,
while outside the margins of society, less exploitive than the circumstances they
endured during the bulk of their existences in Missouri. In Blythe, California, a
small town in the Colorado Desert, law enforcement located them easily. Less
than a year earlier, Mark had run away to this same place. The two had simply
returned to the only other home they had known.
Both boys were cognitively impaired. Mark was a special education student
with a substandard IQ of seventy-four. He suffered from absence seizures that
caused him to fade out and then return to consciousness without even realizing
he had ever lost it. 9 His limited capacity left him easily exploited and unable to
navigate the brutal sexual violence of his home life, not that any child could hope
to escape that isolation and exploitation from his caretakers.
Mark and Jessie had fled Missouri to California with no money and no plan.
They managed to find the one person who had been purely kind to them, a bait
and tackle shop owner in Blythe who had allowed Mark’s mentally ill and
impaired, homeless mother buy food and supplies on credit when Mark was a
young child. During Mark and Jessie’s final flight from Missouri, the two slept
in a truck in an open field next to the shop. They were sitting ducks when the
police came to arrest them.
II. TRIAL
Mark’s lawyers at trial presented none of the evidence of his horrific
upbringing or severe limitations and impairments. Mark’s public defenders
knew essentially nothing about their client and did not spend time with him or
his family in order to understand how an eighteen-year-old kid—with neither a
criminal history nor a history of violence—could be involved in such a severe
crime. In many ways, trial counsel took their cues from Mark’s guardian, his
adult cousin. During those years immediately leading up to Mark and Jessie’s
flight from Missouri, Mark’s cousin had preyed upon Mark relentlessly, just as
he had sexually victimized other vulnerable children within this extended
family. He was eager to keep the family’s secrets hidden from defense counsel.
Mark’s trial counsel posed little threat of exposing them.

BESSEL VAN DER KOLK, THE BODY KEEPS THE SCORE: BRAIN, MIND, AND BODY IN THE
HEALING OF TRAUMA 7-89 (2014).
9. See, e.g., Andres M. Kanner, Recognition of the Various Expressions of Anxiety,
Psychosis, and Aggression in Epilepsy, 45 EPILEPSIA 22, 22–24 (2004); Michael Trimble &
Anthony Freeman, An Investigation of Religiosity and the Gastaut-Geschwindsyndrome in Patients
with Temporal Lobe Epilepsy, 9 EPILEPSY & BEHAV. 407, 411 (2006); Adam Zeman, Tales from
the Temporal Lobes, 352 N. ENGL. J. MED. 119, 119–21 (2005).
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The unprepared and under resourced defense attorneys were no match for
the special prosecutors brought in to secure a death sentence. After a change of
venue due to pre-trial publicity, Mark Christeson was tried in Vernon County,
Missouri. But local prosecutors did not carry out this capital prosecution.
Instead, the case was handled by a special unit of attorneys dedicated to traveling
throughout the state to step in for local prosecutors in county courthouses in
order to conduct capital cases. Under the lead of Attorney General Jeremiah
“Jay” Nixon, Robert Ahsens, one of the most infamous assistants in the unit,
prosecuted Mr. Christeson’s case. 10 The unit had a well-established pattern and
practice of gravely unethical and unconstitutional tactics. Many of these
instances resulted in several wrongful murder convictions and resultant
exonerations. 11 After Mr. Christeson’s trial, he had a perfunctory appeal to the
Missouri Supreme Court, which affirmed the trial court’s judgment. 12
III. STATE POST-CONVICTION
In 2001, Mark’s case returned to his trial court, 13 where new public
defenders were tasked with challenging additional constitutional violations in

10. Kenny Hulshof led this division for years before being elected to Congress, securing the
Republican nomination for Governor in 2008, and then losing to the Democratic incumbent and his
former boss, Jay Nixon. See Alan Zagier, Who killed Cathy Robertson?, COLUM. DAILY TRIB.
(Aug. 2, 2009), http://www.columbiatribune.com/72ab0a1e-ef00-52c8-bc68-ffa6234d2357.html
[https://perma.cc/Y8DN-3RUN]. During that campaign, journalists uncovered Mr. Hulshof’s
unethical indictment and prosecution of a teenager for murder in Chillicothe. Id. In Mark
Woodworth’s case, the circuit judge in his county wrote Mr. Hulshof directly to solicit his unit
taking over the murder case for the local prosecuting attorney in order to charge Mr. Woodworth
at the judge’s urging and despite the county attorney’s determination that there was no basis to
indict the teenager. Id.
11. Joshua Kezer spent sixteen years in prison before he was exonerated in 2009. In granting
his writ of habeas corpus and ordering his release, the Cole County circuit court found that “the
prosecutors repeatedly misstated the evidence” to the jury and hid exculpatory evidence. Findings
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Judgment at 2–3, 19, 31–33, 44, Kezer v. Dormire, No. 08ACCC00293 (Cole Cty., Feb. 17, 2009) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)). Dale Helmig
was exonerated in 2010 and released from prison after serving seventeen years, when a DeKalb
county court judge ruled that the prosecutors knowingly presented false testimony to the jury and
then used it to make “highly improper” arguments as to the defendant’s guilt. Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law at 55, 79–80, 85, 87–89, Helmig v. Denny, No. 09DK-CC00110 (Dekalb Cty.,
Nov. 3, 2010). Richard Clay’s death sentence and conviction were vacated in 2001 by a federal
district court because the prosecution lied to the jury about the existence of a plea deal with a state’s
witness. Clay v. Bowersox, 367 F.3d 993, 997 (8th Cir. 2004).
12. State v. Christeson, 50 S.W.3d 251, 273 (Mo. banc 2001).
13. See Christeson v. State, 131 S.W.3d 796, 799–802 (Mo. banc 2004). Missouri’s
mechanism for state post-conviction review from an unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful
conviction and sentence requires a petitioner to “seek relief in the sentencing court for the claims
enumerated.” MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.15.
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his case. 14 The resulting perfunctory performance by these state post-conviction
attorneys caused more harm to Mark’s legal position. Many of Mark’s family
witnesses met the state post-conviction lawyers for the first time when they
appeared, under subpoena, to testify at depositions at a Ramada Inn, testimony
that typically took about ten or fifteen minutes from start to finish. Tragically,
many of these family members held indispensable information for Mark’s case
at that point, information that would come to light from investigation conducted
years later. But his lawyers from the state defender system, in effect, buried this
information by serially lurching into the depositions without prior investigation
or even discussions with the witnesses. At bottom, post-conviction counsel
failed to expose the rampant incest and sexual abuse that Mark was subjected to
and observed for his entire life (and which the attorney could have discovered
had he only conducted a courthouse search). 15 Naturally, the family members
did not volunteer information about the sadistic, often shameful, family history
or Mark’s own brutal upbringing.
Meaningful investigation and preparation of witnesses would have yielded
considerable evidence of Mark’s life history and acute intellectual, cognitive,
and psychological limitations. By failing to engage the witnesses in a manner
adhering to professional norms, the lawyers forfeited the evidence for all future
appeals. Even worse, the Missouri public defenders superficially engaged
witnesses just enough to provide a veneer of performance. Due to the ever-more
onerous procedural barriers erected in the federal habeas corpus and state postconviction schemes, this veneer resulted in procedurally sealing off the
underlying substance, the actual evidence, from presentation and weighing by
any court. 16 The basic legal consequences of this facade was the vitiation,
14. Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15 governs motions to vacate felony convictions posttrial. It requires that such motions “include every claim known to the movant for vacating, setting
aside, or correcting the judgment or sentence. The movant shall declare in the motion that the
movant has listed all claims for relief known to the movant and acknowledging the movant’s
understanding that the movant waives any claim for relief known to the movant that is not listed in
the motion.” MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.15(c). Mr. Christeson’s counsel facially raised multiple
meritorious constitutional challenges, many of which would be thereby exhausted and thus
available for presentation in a federal habeas application considered under the deferential review
standard applicable under the 1996 amendments to the process. See infra note 16.
15. See, e.g., Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 383 (2005) (finding counsel ineffective for
failing to examine the defendant’s prior conviction file despite knowing that the prosecution
planned to use the prior conviction to prove an aggravating circumstance).
16. Since enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”), the complexity of federal habeas corpus procedure has dramatically increased—and
to the profound detriment of the habeas petitioner. The Supreme Court’s so-called “fair-minded
jurist” rule announced in Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770 (2011), to govern review of state
court constitutional determinations is such that, “if the ‘fair-minded jurist’ rule were taken literally,
it would mean that a federal court could never grant habeas relief.” Stephen A. Reinhardt, The
Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever Increasing
Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly
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largely, of constitutional review by the Missouri courts and, prospectively, the
federal courts, as discussed below. In the end, no judge ever addressed the grave
constitutional deficiencies in Mark’s case, 17 especially concerning the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against executing the intellectually disabled and the
Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel in developing and
presenting mitigation evidence. 18
In fact, the “judge” who evaluated the meager claims litigated in Mark’s
post-conviction motion was not actually a “judge” at the time of his review.
When Mark’s state post-conviction proceedings began, his trial judge had been
voted off the bench. 19 Yet, in an extraordinary determination, the Missouri
Supreme Court ordered the former judge to preside over Mark’s post-conviction
litigation. 20 At the end of the proceedings, the former judge signed the State’s
lengthy proposed order without changing even a single punctuation mark or
word. The only indication that he even looked at the document was that he
signed and filled in the date, April 23, 2003, on the only lines the State had left
for him to complete. The Missouri Supreme Court then affirmed this denial of
relief. 21
Five years had passed since Mark’s arrest and significant changes to our
death penalty jurisprudence had transpired. In June 2002, the U.S. Supreme
Court, in Atkins v. Virginia, ruled it unconstitutional to execute the intellectually
disabled. 22 The reverberations of that case were significant, particularly in
Missouri. First, while Atkins was still pending, the state supreme court stayed
the execution of Christopher Simmons due to the potential impact of Atkins on
juvenile capital defendants. Once Atkins was decided, the Missouri Supreme
Court vacated Mr. Simmons’s death sentence—which it had previously upheld
for decades—ruling that pursuant to Atkins it was unconstitutional to execute

Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1229 (2015) (emphasis in original). Richter
states: “As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show
that the state court’s ruling . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood
and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Id. at
1228 (quoting Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786–87) (emphases in original).
17. Order Denying Rule 60(b) Motion to Reopen Final Judgment Dismissing Habeas Corpus
Application as Untimely, Christeson v. Roper, No. 04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo. Mar. 9, 2016),
ECF 150.
18. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (concluding that capital punishment
of a mentally retarded individual constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 377, 393 (2005) (finding
ineffective assistance of counsel in capital case where the defense did not request a file which would
have shown that defendant’s mental health and childhood presented mitigating factors for the
penalty phase of his trial).
19. Christeson v. State, 131 S.W.3d 796, 800 (Mo. banc 2004).
20. Id.
21. Id. at 802.
22. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
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minors. 23 In so finding, the court thus held that Atkins had effectively overruled
Stanford v. Kentucky, which had previously established that it was constitutional
to execute juveniles. 24 Later, Simmons v. Roper was upheld by the Supreme
Court. 25 In addition to these landmark decisions, in the time between Mr.
Christeson’s arrest and state post-conviction proceedings, the Supreme Court
had issued several key opinions recognizing that it was unconstitutional for
lawyers to fail to develop available mitigation evidence. 26
All of these decisions should have helped Mark Christeson. Yet, his state
public defenders failed utterly to litigate any of these critical changes in the law.
Federal court should have been the place for Mark to finally secure meaningful
review of the profound constitutional questions in his case. Mark’s federal
lawyers had an important and legally weighty story to tell, but they discarded
his case before ever starting it.
IV. FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS
In the spring of 2004, Mr. Christeson’s state post-conviction attorney from
the Missouri Public Defender System contacted two private attorneys in the St.
Louis area to determine their willingness to accept appointment under the
Criminal Justice Act, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3599, for Mr. Christeson’s federal
habeas case. 27 They agreed and Mark’s state public defender drafted a nominal
pro se motion for their consideration, 28 which he then had notarized in his office
and filed for Mr. Christeson in the district court on May 14, 2004. 29 This was
just three days after the denial of rehearing and the resumption of the one-year
statute of limitations of which only thirty-one days had elapsed between the
finality of the judgment on direct review and the initiation of the state collateral
review proceedings under Mo. Rule 29.15. 30 On July 2, 2004, the district court
provisionally granted the appointment motion, making it contingent upon the
attorneys’ establishment of their qualifications and the court’s approval of a
budget. 31 After each attorney entered his appearance, they filed the requisite

23. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 413 (Mo. banc 2003) aff’d sub nom.,
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
24. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989).
25. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578–79 (2005).
26. See Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 537–38 (2003); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,
398–99 (2000).
27. Transcript of Hearing at 8, 47, Christeson v. Griffith, No. 16–2730, (8th Cir. Jan. 23,
2017). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 3599.
28. Transcript of Hearing at 47–49, Christeson, No. 16–2730, (8th Cir. Jan. 23, 2017).
29. Motion to Appoint Counsel, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo.
May 14, 2004), ECF 3.
30. Christeson v. State, 131 S.W.3d 796, 800 (Mo. banc 2004).
31. Order Provisionally Granting Motion to Appoint Counsel at 1, Christeson v. Roper, No.
4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo. May 14, 2004), ECF No. 5.
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budget on July 28, 2004. 32 Then the attorneys waited for the court to approve
their budget and thereby complete their appointment. Between July and October,
Mark’s state public defender wrote him several times that the federal lawyers
had contacted the judge’s clerk and were waiting for the court to approve the
budget so they “can then begin work on your case.” 33
The lawyers themselves had no contact of any kind—not a letter, a call, nor
a visit—with Mr. Christeson until May 27, 2005, 34 over a year after they moved
for appointment and, it would emerge, over six weeks after their deadline for
his habeas corpus petition on April 10, 2005. 35 They did not file a motion to
renew the budget, or anything else for that matter, until August 5, 2005—one
year and ninety days after they moved for appointment—when they filed a
hastily prepared fifty-two page habeas petition, which was largely cut and pasted
from his state court petition. 36 That petition was filed four months after the oneyear statute of limitations had expired. It was woefully late.
When the State challenged their pleadings for being very late, the attorneys
defended themselves and offered highly convoluted and plainly incorrect
explanations of a calculation of the limitations period that it appears, in fact, they
had not actually calculated at the time. 37 Throughout this litigation over their
blown deadline and in the ensuing years, they had next to nothing to do with
Mark. After the courts ruled definitively that the filing had been very late and
the case was dismissed without any review of the merits, the attorneys failed
even to explain this dire situation to Mark. He had no understanding at all about
his predicament for many years.
Had the lawyers admitted that they abandoned their client, as the record so
clearly demonstrates, Mark could have had a chance at federal review. Instead,
they repeatedly argued in defense of their own mistake. In April 2014, these
lawyers, perhaps to clear their conscious, sought expert advice and contacted
consulting counsel. They sought an assessment of what might be done at this
very late date, in the midst of monthly executions in Missouri. Specifically, the
Missouri Supreme Court had issued an order to show cause why the court should
not set an execution date for Mr. Christeson. 38 By that point, the Supreme Court
32. Order Provisionally Granting Motion to Appoint Counsel at 1–3, Christeson, No. 4:04–
cv–08004–DW.
33. Transcript of Hearing at 63, 65, 84, 135–36, Christeson v. Griffith, No. 16–2730 (8th Cir.
Jan. 23, 2017).
34. Transcript of Hearing at 80, Christeson v. Griffith, No. 16–2730 (8th Cir. Jan. 23, 2017).
35. Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891, 892 (2015).
36. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 52, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW
(W.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2007), ECF 10.
37. Motion to Alter, Amend or Set Aside Judgment at 4, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–
08004–DW (W.D. Mo. Feb. 12, 2007), ECF 54.
38. Order for Parties to File Written Notice at 1, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–
DW (W.D. Mo. May 27, 2014), ECF 63 (ordering each party to promptly file a notice with the
court if an execution date was set for Mr. Christeson).
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of Missouri had entered execution dates for six men whom, in turn, the State of
Missouri executed between November 2013 and March 2014. 39
The appointed attorneys requested that counsel meet Mr. Christeson at the
Potosi Correctional Center and then sit down with them in their office in
suburban St. Louis to discuss what might be done to litigate equitable tolling of
the federal statute of limitations, the deadline they had missed in 2005. When
new counsel arrived at the prison to meet with Mark, two things were
immediately clear. First, he had absolutely no idea that his case had been
dismissed seven years prior. His simple understanding was that his case was still
in court, that his “appeals” were ongoing. 40 Second, he suffered from cognitive
impairments. Judging from the initial budget filing by his appointed attorneys,
the second observation was not a surprise. The federal lawyers initially had
requested $4,000 in their budget for a neuropsychological evaluation. 41 Yet,

39. On July 1, 2013, the Honorable Mary Russell was sworn in as Chief Justice. Marshall
Griffin, Mary Russell To Become Chief Justice Of Mo. Supreme Court Next Week, ST. LOUIS PUB.
RADIO, June 26, 2013, http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/mary-russell-become-chief-justice-mosupreme-court-next-week#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/U8FP-JD5G]. That day, the State renewed
motions to set execution dates for Joseph Franklin and Allen Nicklasson in implicit defiance of a
Missouri Supreme Court order entered August 14, 2012 concerning four pending motions by the
State to obtain execution dates. Renewed Motion to Set Execution Date, State v. Nicklasson, No.
SC79163 (Mo. banc. July 1, 2013). In that August 14, 2012 order, the Missouri Supreme Court had
deemed it premature to set any execution during the pendency of discovery in a federal lethal
injection challenge then active in the Western District of Missouri. Robert Patrick, Missouri
execution dates postponed because of suit over new drug, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 15,
2012, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/missouri-execution-dates-postponedbecause-of-suit-over-new-drug/article_9f82e200-e672-11e1-b3eb-0019bb30f31a.html [https://per
ma.cc/YNG6-6ZCA]. On August 14, 2013, exactly one year after the court’s lethal injection stay
and with discovery in the federal lethal injection litigation still pending, the Russell Court set
execution dates for both Mr. Franklin and Mr. Nicklasson. Both men were executed before the end
of the year. Sam Levin, Joseph Franklin, Serial Killer Who Shot Larry Flynt, Gets Execution Date
in Missouri, RIVERFRONT TIMES, Aug. 15, 2013, https://www.riverfronttimes.com/newsblog/2013
/08/15/joseph-franklin-serial-killer-who-shot-larry-flynt-gets-execution-date-in-missouri
[https://perma.cc/JD3D-DB9W]. This ushered in the aforementioned period of executions wherein
the supreme court entered show cause orders at a near monthly interval to capital prisoners who
had concluded their federal habeas proceedings. Todd C. Frankel, Execution drug worked quickly,
but debate persists on use, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 21, 2013, at A1, A6. As set forth
below, it later emerged that Mr. Christeson’s lawyers wrote him about his show cause order dated
April 7, 2014. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 163-64, Christeson v. Roper, No. 04-08004
(W.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2017), ECF 175. Instead of giving him a sober assessment of his dire situation,
they offered assurances that the court was merely carrying out an “administrative” piece of
housekeeping. Id.
40. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 8, Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891 (2014) (No. 146873).
41. Memorandum of Filing Proposed Budget, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW
(W.D. Mo. May 14, 2004), ECF No. 8.
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despite obtaining the funding from the court, the lawyers failed to pursue any
mental or psychological testing.
After meeting Mark, recruited counsel met with the appointed attorneys who
had solicited their consultation. Recruited counsel explained that a review of
appointed counsel’s file of their representation of Mr. Christeson would be
critical in determining whether equitable tolling of the statute of limitations
could be litigated. Many boxes from Mr. Christeson’s trial, direct appeal, and
state post-conviction litigation, were arrayed in a conference room in the original
lawyers’ offices. But not a single document within that room came from the
federal counsel’s file pursuant to their 2004 appointment by the Western District
of Missouri. After fruitless discussion about the need to assess their file and their
actual conduct between their appointment and their late filing of Mark’s federal
habeas petition, the meeting ended.
The next day, on May 7, 2014, Mark’s appointed attorneys filed their
response to the Missouri Supreme Court’s show cause order. 42 Despite being
made aware, repeatedly, that their conflict of interest against Mr. Christeson
foreclosed any assertions about their own conduct and actions relating to their
appointment, the lawyers made a self-interested portrayal of those very things. 43
In the very same pleading, the appointed attorneys explicitly recognized their
own conflict, even as they manifested it. 44
Because the filing was adverse to Mr. Christeson, it created ethical
obligations for counsel recruited to consult on this case. Ethics advice confirmed
the need to alert the appointing court to the conflict of interest under which the
2004-appointed attorneys labored. Recruited counsel thus filed a notifying
pleading, as an interested party, apprising the federal court of the misconduct of
the appointed attorneys during the critical stage in Mr. Christeson’s habeas case,
when AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations was running. 45 The pleading
explained that appointed counsel had abandoned their client prior to the
expiration of the statutory time limit, and then, after the fact, attempted to hide
that from the courts and from their client. 46 The abandonment and subsequent
cover up created an unwaivable conflict of interest. The filing set forth the need
for the district court to appoint new unconflicted lawyers to review the case and

42. Appellant’s Response to Order to Show Cause at 1, State v. Christeson, 50 S.W.3d 251
(Mo. 2001) (No. SC 82082).
43. Id. at 12–13.
44. Id. at 12; Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891, 894 (2015) (“The court’s principal error was
its failure to acknowledge [counsel’s] conflict of interest. . . . Counsel cannot reasonably be
expected to make such an argument, which threatens their professional reputation and livelihood.”).
45. Notice by Friends of the Court of Petitioner’s Need for Substitution by Conflict Free
Counsel at 1–35, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo. May 23, 2014), ECF
62.
46. Id. at 3–8.
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litigate on Mr. Christeson’s behalf. 47 Pro bono counsel, acting as “friends of the
court,” submitted their availability to accept appointment while insisting that
Mr. Christeson, at bottom, needed qualified, conflict-free attorneys to address
these grave matters for the district court. 48
In turn, the district court ordered the extant, conflicted lawyers, and the
State, to respond to the pleading. 49 That order precipitated the objection to
requesting the conflicted lawyers to argue (yet again) against the interests of
their current client. The district court ignored the objection and Mr. Christeson’s
initial lawyers did exactly what was feared. In two separate filings, appointed
counsel violated multiple ethical obligations to their client (including the
attorney-client privilege) and continued to defend their conduct and actions,
insisting that they had intentionally filed the petition 117 days after the actual
deadline. 50 Appointed counsel also argued that it would be a waste of court
resources to appoint out-of-district counsel for Mr. Christeson. 51 The district
court ruled that new counsel was not needed. 52
While litigating the district court’s order in the Eighth Circuit, Missouri
issued an execution warrant for Mr. Christeson, scheduling his execution for
forty days later. 53 The Eighth Circuit declined to grant a stay of execution and,
days before the scheduled date of October 29, 2014 at 12:01 a.m. CDT,
summarily affirmed the district court without an opinion. 54 Pro bono counsel
sought certiorari and a stay in the Supreme Court. Midday on October 28, 2014,
Justice Alito entered a unique order for supplemental briefing on the question of
whether Mr. Christeson had authorized pro bono counsel to represent him. 55
About ten hours after this simultaneous briefing by the State and pro bono
counsel and about two hours before the appointed time for Mark’s execution,

47. Id. at 18–25.
48. Id. at 31–33.
49. Order for Written Response to Notice by Friends of the Court of Petitioner’s Need for
Substitution by Conflict Free Counsel, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo.
May 27, 2014), ECF 63.
50. Response to Court Order for Written Response at 1, 5, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–
08004–DW (W.D. Mo. June 16, 2014), ECF 73; Response to Motion to Reconsider at 1–4,
Christeson v. Roper No. 4:04-cv-08004-DW (W.D. Mo. June 20, 2014), ECF 75.
51. Response to Court Order for Written Response at 19, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–
08004–DW (W.D. Mo. June 16, 2014), ECF 73.
52. Order Denying Motion to Appoint Substitute Counsel, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–
08004–DW (W.D. Mo. July 10, 2014), ECF 78.
53. Warrant of Execution, State v. Christeson, No. SC82082 (Mo. banc. Sept. 19, 2014).
54. Judgment Denying Motion for Stay of Execution, Christeson v. Roper, No. 14–3889 (8th
Cir. 2014).
55. Order for Supplemental Briefs, Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891 (2015) (No. 14–6873)
(directing the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding whether Mark had authorized Phillips
Black attorneys to move on his behalf).
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the U.S. Supreme Court stayed the execution. 56 Three months later, the Court
entered a per curiam opinion summarily reversing the Eighth Circuit, by a seven
to two vote and remanding the case for appointment of conflict free counsel. 57
The Court held that the “appointed attorneys—who had missed the filing
deadline—could not be expected to argue that Christeson was entitled to the
equitable tolling of the statute of limitations.” 58 As the Supreme Court
explained,
Christeson’s only hope for securing review of the merits of his habeas claims
was to file a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) seeking to
reopen final judgment on the ground that AEDPA’s statute of limitations should
have been equitably tolled. But [original counsel] could not be expected to file
such a motion on Christeson’s behalf, as any argument for equitable tolling
would be premised on their own malfeasance in failing to file timely the habeas
petition. 59

As the Court observed, that malfeasance had led one renowned ethical expert to
opine: “if this was not abandonment, I am not sure what would be.” 60
Two months later, the Eighth Circuit remanded the case to the district court,
which terminated the appointment of the attorneys appointed nearly eleven years
prior and appointed formerly pro bono counsel to serve under 18 U.S.C. § 3599
as the conflict-free counsel to which the Supreme Court had adjudged Mr.
Christeson was entitled. 61 Pursuant to this order, new counsel prepared a budget
requesting funds to cover the necessary investigation and expert assistance. 62
Two things had to be established for the courts to reopen Mr. Christeson’s
federal habeas application. First, as the Supreme Court had observed, pursuant
to Holland v. Florida, “[t]olling based on counsel’s failure to satisfy AEDPA’s
statute of limitations is available only for ‘serious instances of attorney
misconduct.’” 63 Second, Holland required that the petitioner, in the normal
course, had to establish that he, individually, had been reasonably diligent in
protecting his rights, despite being confined in prison. 64 This is a fact-bound
inquiry and would require investigation into the capacity for diligence of Mr.

56. Stay of Execution, Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891 (2015) (No. 14–6837).
57. Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891, 896 (2015) (per curiam).
58. Id. at 892.
59. Id. at 892–93.
60. Id. at 892.
61. Order Granting Substitution of Counsel at 1, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–
DW (W.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2015), ECF 110.
62. This budget proposal was filed ex parte and under seal. Order Granting Motion to File
Budget Under Seal, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo. Apr. 20, 2015), ECF
121.
63. Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891, 891 (2015) (per curiam) (citing Holland v. Florida,
560 U.S. 631, 652 (2010)).
64. Holland, 560 U.S. at 649.
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Christeson, who, the Supreme Court had observed “appears to have severe
cognitive disabilities that lead him to rely entirely on his attorneys, [and] may
not have been aware of [his petition’s] dismissal.” 65 The Court suggested, for
the first time since its 2010 ruling in Holland, that the given petitioner’s
individual impairments or lack of capacity to overcome the circumstances of his
attorneys’ misconduct could warrant equitable tolling. 66
In addition to Mark’s low IQ score and his special education records, there
existed other evidence of impaired cognition and potential brain injury. Multiple
prisoners described Mark as “slow” and “childlike” in his thinking. Mark
suffered from absence seizures that caused him essentially to lose consciousness
for moments at a time. Because of his youth, the details of his crime involving a
mother and children, and his own status as a victim of child sexual exploitation,
he was immediately sexually preyed upon when he entered the maximumsecurity prison. In addition to unrelenting sexual assault and trauma in prison,
he was beaten nearly to death in 2000 by two prisoners, whose letter bragging
about what they had done bizarrely was published by their local newspaper as a
sort of celebration of rough justice. 67 All of these factors severely impacted
Mark’s capacity to diligently assert his rights in 2004-2005 and undermined his
ability to question his attorneys when they assured him that everything was fine.
Correspondence reflects that even as the Missouri Supreme Court issued a show
cause order moving toward issuing an execution warrant, the lawyers wrote to
Mark that it “does not mean that an execution date will be set in your case
anytime in the near future. . . . It appears that the State of Missouri [sic] is doing
nothing more than administratively reviewing all of the capital cases pending in
the state.” 68 As they wrote this, another client of theirs, William Rousan, was set
to be executed just eight days later, 69 following the issuance in his case of the
same show cause order Mr. Christeson had just received. 70 Mr. Rousan was, in
fact, executed on April 23, 2014, as scheduled.
The district court denied the funding request submitted upon the case’s
remand. 71 Instead, it approved a mere fraction of the substantiated budget (about
1/16 of the amount) 72 and, without reason, deprived counsel of the capacity to

65. Christeson, 135 S. Ct. at 892.
66. Id.
67. The Associated Press, Inmates Publicize Retribution Attack on Children’s Killer, SE.
MISSOURIAN, Apr. 18, 2001, at 4A; Editorial, Prison Justice Takes a Pretty Nasty Turn, SE.
MISSOURIAN, Apr. 24, 2001, at B6.
68. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7, Christeson v. Roper, 135 S. Ct. 891 (2014) (No. 14–
6873).
69. Execution Judgment, Rousan v. Lombardi, No. 14–01919 (8th Cir. Apr. 28, 2014).
70. Show Cause Order 79566, Rousan v. State, 48 S.W.3d (Mo. banc Jan. 29, 2014).
71. Order Denying Budget at 2, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo.
Apr. 29, 2015), ECF 122.
72. Id. at 1–2.
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hire experts and conduct the requisite investigation. Subsequent filings proffered
preliminary expert reports showing that serious red flags existed, and that follow
up and full evaluations and assessments were necessary. 73 The experts analyzed
testing data revealing that Mark was in the lowest brackets for memory, recall,
language, and expression. 74 They opined that the impairments were a
combination of organic brain dysfunction and the neurobiologic impact of life
long trauma. 75
Mark’s capacity made him particularly vulnerable to the fraud perpetrated
by his prior counsel. Prior counsel could not provide a single shred of evidence
to suggest that they had undertaken any work on his behalf during the statutorily
relevant, 334-day time period. 76 They could not produce a single piece of work
product, nor a memo, note, time entry, bill, email, letter, or even a post-it created
during that time. They never interviewed a single witness or expert. They had
not met with or emailed resource counsel. They had absolutely no contact with
Mr. Christeson during that time. Their complete absence of a file was proof, ipso
facto, of their abandonment. 77 As legal expert Prof. Lawrence Fox observed, “no
lawyer[ ] could handle a habeas case without taking notes, writing reviews of
documents, preparing questions in advance of conducting depositions,
researching and outlining legal arguments, summarizing case law, printing out
key cases, and producing research memoranda.” 78
The district court denied the petition without holding a hearing. 79 Though
the state provided no evidence – or even argument—about the attorneys’ action
during the relevant time, the court nonetheless found that there was not
abandonment. 80
The required application for a certificate of appealability (“COA”), pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2253 followed, asking permission to appeal the injustice. 81 This
type of permission is routinely denied by federal courts, even in capital cases. 82

73. Rule 60(b) Motion at 37–41, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo.
Aug. 28, 2015), ECF 125.
74. Id. at 39.
75. Id. at 34–45.
76. See Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 133-145, Christeson v. Roper, No. 04–08004
(W.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2017), ECF 145.
77. Appellants Addendum to Brief Supplemental Report of Lawrence J. Fox at 4–6,
Christeson v. Griffith, No. 16–2730 (8th Cir. Jan. 24, 2017).
78. Id. at 5.
79. Order Denying Rule 60(b)(6) Motion at 21, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW
(W.D. Mo. Mar. 8, 2016), ECF 150.
80. Id. at 16.
81. Application for Certificate of Appealability at 10–103, Christeson v. Griffith, No. 16–2730
(8th Cir. Aug. 16, 2016).
82. See, e.g., Porter v. Gramley, 112 F.3d 1308, 1312 (7th Cir. 1997) (“[I]n a capital case…the
severity of the penalty does not in itself suffice to warrant the automatic issuing of a certificate.”)
(quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n. 4 (1983)).
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Thus, several organizations filed amicus petitions in support: The American Bar
Association, represented by Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, and Flom; a group
of former judges, represented by Goldstein & Russell; and three national defense
associations: the National Association of Criminal Defense Attorneys, National
Legal Aid and Defender Association, and National Association of Public
Defenders, represented by the Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center
in St. Louis Missouri. 83 The Amici argued that the district court’s denial of
funding represented a dangerous precedent – for Mr. Christeson as well as other
indigent capital defendants – and part of a troubling pattern in certain states
around the country undermining the access to justice and the rule of law. 84
Three months later, on October 12, 2016, with the COA request still
pending, the Missouri Supreme Court set another execution date for Mr.
Christeson. 85 This was an unprecedented measure. The state’s high court had not
previously ordered an execution date before litigation under the federal habeas
corpus statute had run its course in the federal courts. 86 The Eighth Circuit
continued to entertain the request for two more months, until December 12,
when it granted permission to appeal on four separate issues, and set a briefing
schedule that extended six weeks beyond Missouri’s scheduled execution date. 87
Nine days later, however, on motion of the State, the court expedited its
schedule, condensing the two-month process into three weeks, thereby

83. Brief of Am. Bar Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Christeson v. Griffith,
No. 16–2730 (8th Cir. Aug. 17, 2016); Brief of Former Federal and State Judges as Amici Curiae
Supporting Petitioner, Christeson v. Roper, No. 16-2730 (8th Cir. Aug. 17, 2016); Brief for
Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center, et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
Christeson v. Roper, No. 16–2730 (8th Cir. Aug. 19, 2016).
84. See, e.g., Brief for Roderick and Solange MacArthur Justice Center, et al. In Support of
Petitioner at 1, 31-32, Christeson, No. 16–2730.
85. Warrant of Execution, State v. Christeson, No. SC82082 (Mo. banc. Oct. 12, 2016).
86. Further, in Mr. Christeson’s case, the U.S. Supreme Court had stayed his 2014 execution
date and ultimately remanded the case to the lower federal courts, thereby triggering a Missouri
Supreme Court rule providing for the exhaustion of the right to relief before the setting of a new
date. MO. SUP. CT. R. 30.30(c) (“If an execution is stayed, the Court shall set a new date of
execution upon motion of the state or upon its own motion. No such motion shall be considered
prior to exhaustion of the defendant’s right to seek relief in the Supreme Court of the United States
following review of the defendant’s direct appeal, state post-conviction motion, and federal habeas
corpus decision unless the defendant fails to pursue such remedy.”) Since this precedent in
Christeson, the Missouri Supreme Court entered an execution date for Mr. Russell Bucklew on
November 21, 2017 despite ongoing federal court action pursuant to a U.S. Supreme Court stay of
execution. See Bucklew v. Lombardi, 783 F.3d 1120, 1122 (8th Cir. 2015). Mr. Bucklew received
another stay of execution from the U.S. Supreme Court on the day of his scheduled execution.
Bucklew v. Precythe, 17–3052, March 20, 2018.
87. Order Granting Certificate of Appealability, Christeson v. Griffith, No. 16–2730 (8th Cir.
Dec. 13, 2016).
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compressing the timetable to conclude briefing before the execution date
imposed by the state court two months prior. 88
The crux of the argument on appeal was that the district court needed, at the
very least, to hold a hearing on the issue of abandonment. That court’s factual
finding that the attorneys had not abandoned Mark was not only unsupported by
the evidence, it was actually contrary to the only evidence in the record and the
determinations made by the U.S. Supreme Court in this very case. Apparently
recognizing the efficacy of the COA application, and perhaps to protect itself
from another reversal, the Court of Appeals interrupted its accelerated briefing
schedule and, in a bizarre turn of events, granted the defense’s longstanding
request for an evidentiary hearing, remanding for that limited purpose while
expressly retaining jurisdiction over the appeal. 89 Briefly, it appeared that the
circuit court was contemplating meaningful process. But less than 120 minutes
later, before it had received the mandate or even electronic notice of the appellate
court’s order, the district court took the extraordinary step of ordering an
evidentiary hearing to occur less than 48 hours later. 90 By the following
morning, before court opened, discovery motions were filed seeking the
requisite, targeted production for a meaningful hearing, specifically requesting
copies of the lawyers’ calendars, billing records, telephone records, as well as
the identity of their former paralegals or assistants in order to prove that they
had not been working on the case during the time in question. 91 The district court
denied the motions and denied a continuance, giving no credence to the
problems resulting from allotting only forty-one hours’ notice of the hearing and
88. Order Granting Expedited Appeal, Christeson v. Griffith, No. 16–2730, (8th Cir. Dec. 22,
2016).
89. Christeson v. Griffith, 845 F.3d 1239, 1240 (8th Cir. 2017), as amended (Feb. 6, 2017).
90. Order Granting Evidentiary Hearing, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW
(W.D. Mo. Jan. 18, 2017), ECF 160.
91. Motion for Discovery at 8-9, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo.
Jan. 19, 2017), ECF 165. Had the district court granted discovery, a stay of execution would almost
certainly have been necessary. In considering the district court’s denial of the motion, it must be
noted that the “good cause” standard for obtaining discovery under Rule 6(a) of the “Rules
Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts” is lower than, and subsumed
within, the standard to obtain an evidentiary hearing, as a habeas petitioner may be entitled to Rule
6 discovery before he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. See Rules Covering § 2254 cases, 28
U.S.C.A. foll. §2254 R. 6(a) (2010); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 80–83 (1977) (noting the
district court’s power to conduct discovery under Rule 6 and that petitioners are “entitled to careful
consideration and plenary processing of [claims], including full opportunity for presentation of the
relevant facts,” but declining to order an evidentiary hearing) (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S.
286, 298 (1969)); accord East v. Scott, 55 F.3d 996, 1000–002 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding a state
habeas petitioner “has shown good cause for discovery under Rule 6” although the Court “need not
. . . decide whether [petitioner] is entitled to an evidentiary hearing,” noting that a “hearing is
required . . . only if the record reveals a genuine question of fact” and “[a]llegations that are facially
sufficient to entitle a petitioner to discovery under Rule 6 might not entitle a petitioner to an
evidentiary hearing”).
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impeding the ability of Mr. Christeson’s counsel, let alone witnesses, to
physically attend the hearing. 92
Mark’s prior lawyers, however, wasted no time getting to the court. The
Attorney General’s Office immediately called them (ex parte) and instructed
them to travel across the state from St. Louis. Eleven days before the execution
date, without even receiving service of a subpoena as their enduring duty to Mr.
Christeson would require—at a minimum—before they could give testimony
adverse to their former client, they got in their cars and traversed the state for
five hours to get to Kansas City to testify. These men had taken eleven months
to meet their client for the first time but managed to set aside everything else
instantly in order to testify against him in proceedings days before his execution
date.
On the stand the lawyers swore up and down that they had not abandoned
their client, but that they had intentionally calculated the date by rejecting the
stated law of the jurisdiction—law explicitly invoked in their own motion seeking
appointment in this case—and using a conflicting interpretation from a wholly
different federal circuit. 93 They conceded that they had failed to meet him for
329 days after appearing in the case. 94 They unequivocally defended their total
lack of a file: they swore that in preparing a federal habeas petition for a capital
petitioner they did not take a single written note—not even a post-it note—and
thus had nothing to produce. 95 They both testified that they met only in person
and thus generated not a single email during their representation of Mr.
Christeson. 96 They testified that they conducted research only in books and
physically at a law library, thus never producing an electronic record from any
service such as Westlaw, Lexis, or Pacer. 97 Despite having drafted and filed a
budget (and repeatedly calling the clerk to check its status), they never kept a
time entry for their activities. 98 They testified that they never intended to bill
because they never billed in any capital cases. 99 Efforts on cross-examination to
impeach them with documentary proof of their bills (public records available
from the district court’s own dockets) were prevented by counsel for the State’s
objections, which the district judge sustained. 100 All told, the judge sustained all

92. Order Denying Motion to Reschedule Evidentiary Hearing, Christeson v. Roper, No.
4:04–cv–08004–DW (W.D. Mo. Jan. 19, 2017), ECF 167.
93. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 23–24, Christeson v. Roper, No. 4:04–cv–08004–
DW (W.D. Mo. Jan. 23, 2017), ECF 175.
94. Id. at 79–80.
95. Id. at 55–58, 151.
96. Id. at 85.
97. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 55–56, Christeson, No. 04-08004.
98. Id. at 59.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 87.
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of the Assistant Attorney General’s objections and denied all ten of Mr.
Christeson’s counsel during this hearing. 101
In sum, the testifying lawyers asked the court to simply take their word.
After the five-hour hearing, the judge took a brief recess and returned to the
bench in order to do just that. The court read fact-findings into the record, finding
credible all of the foregoing positions asserted by the testifying lawyers. 102
When the case returned to the federal appeals court in St. Louis, one judge
openly acknowledged that the lawyers’ defense, if true, would still amount to
“deficient” performance, but that, because they “allegedly conducted some legal
research, cursory as it may have been” it did not amount to serious
misconduct. 103 Thus, the lawyers’ excuse was sufficient to eliminate the
development and presentation of all of Mr. Christeson’s possible legal claims,
thereby sending him to his death with no federal review of any violations of the
Constitution. With that, the Circuit Court of Appeals, which had kept the case
pending for seven months prior, issued a short denial seven days after the hastily
ordered hearing, on the Friday afternoon before the Tuesday execution date. 104
This left next to no time to present the case to the U.S. Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court had intervened once in this case, but it would not step
in a second time, manifesting a resistance to exercising its inherent supervisory
powers. 105 Only Justice Ginsburg dissented from the denial of the stay
application, singularly expressing her disquiet with the lower courts’ treatment
of the case since its remand two years prior. 106
V. EPILOGUE
January 31, 2017, 5:37 p.m. CST: The Supreme Court denies Mark
Christeson’s final legal action and application to stay his execution.107 Minutes
later, the governor’s office issued its statement denying clemency. 108 It is now
6:40 p.m., and the prison has cut Mark’s phone line, leaving his lawyers stunned
and frantically calling the prison. The correctional officers will come and escort
Mark to his gurney. There, a Department of Corrections Official will read his

101. Id. at 25–134.
102. Transcript of Evidentiary Hearing at 176–79, Christeson, No. 04–08004.
103. Christeson v. Griffith, 860 F.3d 585, 591 (8th Cir. 2017) (Murphy, J., Concurring) (“Here,
counsel allegedly conducted some legal research, cursory as it may have been. Minimal or mistaken
legal research does not equate to serious attorney misconduct, however.”)
104. Id. at 590.
105. See SUP. CT. R. 10 (“Considerations Governing Review on Certiorari”).
106. Christeson v. Griffith, 137 S. Ct. 910, 910 (2017).
107. Id.
108. Jim Salter, Missouri executes Mark Christeson for 1998 murders of mother and two
children, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Feb. 1, 2017), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crimeand-courts/missouri-executes-mark-christeson-for-murders-of-mother-and-two/article_c926a2846f54-5496-941b-9fbeac1d553e.html [https://perma.cc/PXF3-C4JU].
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final words: “let my family know I love them with all my heart and I’m more
than blessed to have them in my life. . .and thank God for such an amazing
family.” 109 At 6:57 p.m. the Missouri Department of Corrections will begin the
lethal injection protocol. At 7:05 p.m. he will be pronounced dead.
By virtually any measure, Mark’s family had failed him. His life before
prison presaged his life within prison. He was prey, relentlessly exploited and
violated. Yet he was much more than a mere victim. Mark succeeded in seeing
the love that his troubled family had shown him in the years leading up to his
death. For their part, they saw beyond this crime and embraced the human being
Mark was, a man capable of love and generosity of spirit, a person of great
kindness and warmth. So too should our system of laws and the officers of its
courts have fully considered the human dignity of Mr. Christeson and the totality
of circumstances concerned in his case. But that simply did not happen.
In 1998, the same year of the crime for which Mark was condemned, Judge
Blackmar wrote about another deeply troubled life: “The easiest course of action
might be to execute him as a means of extermination or euthanasia, but there
should be a limit to the process of burying our mistakes. The state must bear
some responsibility for the situation which has developed.” 110 So too, we bear
responsibility for the tragic crime and death of Mark Christeson, who spent half
of his life in a maximum-security prison before, just shy of his thirty-seventh
birthday, he met his executioner.

109. Marshall Griffin, Missouri executes Mark Christeson for 1998 triple slayings, ST. LOUIS
PUB. RADIO (Jan. 31, 2017), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/missouri-executes-mark-christes
on-1998-triple-slayings#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/32LV-B2EU].
110. State v. Parkus, 753 S.W.2d 881, 890 (Mo banc. 1988).
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